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Abstract
At present, China’s population aging is accelerating. The 
aging population problem is a stern challenge to pension 
insurance. This paper explore the risk of problems 
pension fund faces from two aspects of the government 
and enterprises, and to analyze the relationship between 
government and enterprises in the face of risk of the old-
age insurance fund, namely the game relationships and 
partnerships. Finally, put forward the countermeasures 
and suggestions for the risk of pension funds.
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INTRODUCTION
China has entered into aging society in 1999, and is one 
of the developing countries in the world to enter the aging 
society prematurely. China will become an aging society 
in 21st Century, and the trend is irreversible. According to 
the prediction of the United Nations, by the middle of the 
21st century, China will become a country of most old-
age population in the world, accounting for 1/5 of the 
total elderly population in the world. By the second half 
of the 21st century, China will become the second-largest 
old-age population country in the word, second only 
to India. Severe aging problems will appear more and 
more prominent. The aging of the population has brought 
a serious challenge to the sustainable development of 
China’s pension insurance fund, the cash gap caused by 
the aging population will cause a huge burden to our 
country’s pension fund.
1.  THE STATUS QUO OF CHINA’S 
POPULATION AGING
1.1  The Status of the Aging Population 
In accordance with the international standard measure, 
when a country or an area of 60 years of age and older 
elderly population reached 10% of the population of 
the society, or the elderly population aged 65 and above 
accounted for 7% of the proportion of the total population, 
it indicates that the aging in the country or area. 
According to the 2010 China’s sixth census data show, 
the elderly population aged 60 and above in China has 
reached 177,650,000, 13.26% of the total population; 65 
years old and on old people mouth 118,830,000 accounted 
for the proportion of the total population reached 8.87%, 
which indicates that China has entered the aging society. 
The population development forecast report of OECD 
(Organization for economic cooperation and development) 
shows that by 2030, the elderly population aged 65 
and above in China accounted for more than Japan and 
become the country with the highest degree of the global 
population aging. Some developed countries have joined 
the list of aging society after they had become rich. 
However, the situation of our country is just the other way 
around. Due to the relatively weak economic foundation, 
a series of problems caused by the aging of the population 
has brought a lot of pressure on China’s comprehensive 
deepening reform, and comprehensively building a well-
off society.
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1.2  The Elderly Population Dependency Ratio
Dependency ratio refers to the ratio between the number 
of non labor population and the labor force, which 
measures the number of maintenance labor force per 
capita of the labor force. With the rapid increase of the 
elderly population, the elderly population of our country is 
increasing. The Figure 1 reflects the changing trend of the 
elderly population dependency ratio in our country from 
1982 to 2012. 
Figure 1 
Trend Chart of Old Age Dependency Ratio from 1982 
to 2012 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics Yearbook of China population 
2-4.
From the figure visible, China’s elderly population 
dependency ratio raising, from 1982 to 8.0% rose to 12.7% 
in 2012, which payments to the pension insurance fund of 
our country brought certain risks. Therefore, improving the 
pension insurance system in our country has an important 
influence on reducing the risk of pension funds.
2 .   C H I N A’ S  E X I S T I N G  P E N S I O N 
INSURANCE SYSTEM
The problem of population aging is a challenge to our 
country’s pension system. Aging population bring-
up ratio rising year by year makes pension number 
increases gradually. However, the number of paid pension 
premiums unchanged or even decreased. The influence of 
the phenomenon of PAYG pattern is the most outstanding. 
The increased number of receive, funds tend to form 
the deficit. At present, our country executes the partial 
accumulation model of social pooling and individual 
account. This model is smaller than the PAYG model 
burden, but there is also some payments risk. China has 
been practiced the PAYG system, change the mode of need 
is a huge restructuring costs, realize the pension system 
transition from PAYG system to partial accumulation 
system, which is bound to create a personal account of 
the problem of the implicit pension debt. With the gradual 
increase of the elderly, elderly population to the working 
age population ratio will continue to increase, the pension 
fund gap will become an important factor restricting the 
healthy development of China’s pension system.
Reducing the risk of payment of pension fund requires 
us to grasp pension fund financing mode. To raise the 
pension insurance fund has three modes: PAYG mode, 
accumulation mode and accumulation mode. According 
to the choice mode of the age structure of the population, 
when a national population age structure is younger or 
system initial implementation, generally take PAYG 
model, because the rate is stable and low. Along with 
the population structure aging and the rate of the service 
worker’s contribution rate is increasing year by year, the 
pattern is often transformed into partial accumulation 
mode or complete accumulation mode. Due to the 
characteristics of population aging in China, after 2003 
the urban retired has a rapid increase, PAYGO will give 
enterprises and workers, and even countries bring huge 
burden. Therefore, in 1997, China began to implement 
a combination of social pooling and individual accounts 
accumulation model.
This paper takes Quzhou city of Zhejiang Province as 
an example to explain the pressure of the foundation fund 
in our country. By the December of 2013, the number of 
workers to participate in the basic old-age insurance to 
586,600 people. Among them, the urban area to participate 
in the basic old-age insurance for 308,700 people, the 
number of 73,200 people, the cumulative balance of funds 
1,313,000,000 yuan, the fund’s ability to pay for 11.22 
months. See Table 1 for details:
Table 1
Quzhou City, Zhejiang Province, the Basic Old-
Age Insurance for Workers and the Fund Balance of 
Payments Situation
Year
The number 
of insurance 
(10 thousand)
Number of 
retirees
(10 thousand)
Year-end 
accumulated 
surplus 
amount (10 
million)
Fund 
payment 
capability 
(month)
2009 18.20 3.09 4.39 10.12
2010 20.51 3.24 4.60 9.10
2011 23.40 3.71 7.53 11.91
2012 27.43 5.60 10.98 12.61
2013 30.87 7.32 13.13 11.22
From the table a data analysis can be seen, in the past 
five years, the situation of Quzhou City balance fund 
slightly better, but the number of funds is still low. For the 
five years, the fund’s ability to pay the longest for 12.61 
months. This is not enough to guarantee the sustainable 
development of the pension fund. By the end of 2013, the 
province’s basic pension insurance funds for the average 
payment capacity of 32.02 months. The existing fund 
of Quzhou City to pay far below the average level of 
the province. With the accelerated pace of aging and the 
number of people in the relative reduction of the number 
of insured, the future of Quzhou may be faced with the 
risk of receiving a non credit.
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3.  THE RISK OF THE EXISTENCE OF 
PENSION INSURANCE FUNDS IN CHINA
China’s endowment insurance system by the PAYG 
system into the partial accumulation system, also a 
serious problems－endowment insurance fund appear 
gap. Statistics show that the future of China’s pension gap 
will reach 6 yuan, China’s pension system to maintain 
sustainable development can not be separated from the 
balance of pension funds. See Table 2 for details:
Table 2
China’s Pension System After Eliminating Financial 
Subsidies
year
Pension
premium income 
(10 million)
Expenses of 
pension insurance 
(10 million)
Balance 
(10 million)
2015 33,346.32 36,461.97 -3,024.87
2014 29,104.1 30,666.1 -1,563
2013 15,501 16,460 -959
2012 15,027 13,948 1,079
Note. Data from Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security 
of the People’s Republic of China.
3.1  Debt Risk
China’s  pension system in f rom PAYG to fund 
accumulative total or semi fund cumulative system 
transformation process, because has not working and 
retired personnel of the cumulative past. And they 
have pension, according to the existing system, then 
the formation of the implicit pension debt.《Under 
the current combination of pooling debt forecasts and 
estimates stealth mode》said, with 2012 as the base, the 
social pooling accounts of hidden debt was 83.6 trillion 
yuan, personal accounts of hidden debt was 2.6 trillion 
yuan, the total urban basic old-age stealth debt pooling 
of insurance under the system of combined 86.2 trillion 
yuan, accounting for 2012 GDP ratio of 166%.Because of 
the huge amount of implicit debt, social pooling account 
funds far enough to make up for the this difference, this 
situation will affect the sustainable development of the 
pension fund, and will lead to a series of economic and 
social problems.
3.2  Enterprises in Arrears of Endowment 
Insurance Risk
Due to the huge amount of arrears, therefore, the 
phenomenon of unpaid pension insurance companies 
exist in the national scope. According to data released 
by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, and by the 
end of 1999 the national enterprises arrears accumulated 
383 billion of which 10,000,000 yuan more than the 
large arrears of more than 200.By the end of 2002, the 
total number of workers pension insurance companies 
owed more than 30 million, owed a total of 44 billion 
employee pension insurance. Among them, the arrears 
million yuan enterprises have 211.By the end of 2006, 
non-payment of basic pension insurance enterprises 
amounted to 43.6 billion yuan, more than ten million 
yuan in arrears nationwide 177 enterprises, total arrears 
of 4.5 billion yuan. Calculate the corporate pension fund 
general according to the balance, a slight accumulation 
principle, arrears of enterprises will have a direct impact 
on the pension insurance fund balance and sustainable 
development.
3.3  Regulatory Risk
At present, China’s endowment insurance fund supervision 
of the main composition is complicated, including many 
aspects: labor and social security department, financial 
department, auditing department, tax department, banks 
and the public. Among them, the relevant government 
departments of administrative supervision have played a 
leading role. At present, China’s regulatory system based 
on administrative supervision, public supervision is weak; 
Administrative regulatory agencies more, the scope of 
the regulatory system is more widely; In addition to the 
enterprises annuity fund, the basic pension insurance fund 
and the National Pension Reserve Fund are not introduced 
market mechanism to determine the pension fund managers; 
There is a lack of clear communication mechanism between 
the pension fund regulators and the public. Under this 
supervision strategy, the legal system of pension insurance 
fund is the slow development of the industry, and ultimately 
will hurt the interests of fund members.
3.4  Investment Risk
Pension insurance fund investment channel is single, the 
efficiency is low, the investment instruments are two kinds 
of national debt and bank deposit, and the investment rate 
is at a relatively low level. The safety principle of this 
investment is based on the sacrifice of market efficiency; 
Improper investment management mode, i l legal 
investment seriously, China’s basic pension insurance 
investment activities by the social insurance agency 
directly. This kind of investment management pattern 
has some defects which are difficult to overcome, which 
can not meet the need of the fund’s investment operation 
and maintenance of value. Pension was diverted, diverted 
serious. There are no unified social supervision channels; 
each department is responsible for policy formulation, but 
also responsible for the supervision and implementation, 
and thus resulting in a large number of insurance 
premiums misappropriation and waste.
4.  THE GAME RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
GOVERNMENT AND ENTERPRISES IN 
THE RISK OF PENSION FUNDS
Game theory is a tool to study the interaction process and 
the result of the decision-making body. In the game theory, 
the decision-making body is called the participants; each 
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participant has a clear goal, each agent’s decision based on 
the knowledge of the decision maker and the expectations 
of other decision makers. The theory of game theory is 
more focused on the behavior decision making, which is 
more close to the reality, thus widening the analysis of the 
traditional economics.
Workers and employers to participate in social insurance 
are the legal mandatory obligations and responsibilities. 
Social insurance is compulsory, and the social insurance 
premium is the legal obligation of the employer and the 
labor parties. Western political scientist Williamson and 
Panpeier by Germany, Britain, Sweden and the United 
States endowment insurance system development history 
inspection, found a variety of specific institutional 
arrangement is actually the result of the game between 
different interest groups; the redistribution function of 
endowment insurance will establish game and game.
The impact of the aging population on the risk of 
pension, resulting in the government’s financial subsidies. 
From the perspective of government, as the main body 
of the social pension insurance, we must protect the 
rights and interests of retired workers, maintain social 
justice and maintain social stability. To defuse the risk of 
population aging on the overall pension, the government 
has two options: to reduce the cost and improve the 
overall rate of pension. To reduce the overall pension cost 
rate is undoubtedly reduce target substitution rate or the 
burden of the system than, target substitution rate reflects 
the living standards of retired workers; reduce the target 
replacement rate has a direct impact on retirement. So 
the government can reduce the burden of the system by 
adjusting the age of retirement. Relative to the enterprises, 
the biggest advantage is that the government has the right 
to make a pension insurance system, which determines 
the enterprises’ pension behavior pattern. Therefore, 
the government raised the rate of payment of pension 
insurance provides a certain financial guarantee, reducing 
the pressure on their financial subsidies.
From the view of enterprises, they are the main body of 
the pension insurance, but as the legal entity of the market, 
it is the principle of profit maximization. In the course of 
the implementation of the system, enterprises take various 
measures to avoid payment obligations. Statistics show 
that the enterprises in the payment of social insurance 
premiums in the presence of serious violations of law. At 
the same time, the government is in the disadvantageous 
position of serious information asymmetry. it is difficult 
to understand the situation of the enterprises in a timely 
and comprehensive way. Therefore, it is difficult for the 
government to conduct a comprehensive and effective 
monitoring of the enterprises’ pension.
The impact of the aging population on the government 
to ensure that the retirement of workers on the basis 
of retirement, by postponing the retirement age and 
raising the rate of payment will be the financial subsidies 
to the enterprises; While the enterprises in the profit 
maximization, the employer pays more attention to the 
current interests, while the government is concerned about 
the continuous and stable development of the society, this 
is the use of units and the government’s game.
5 .   T H E  N E W  C O O P E R A T I V E 
R E L A T I O N S H I P  B E T W E E N 
GOVERNMENT AND ENTERPRISES IN 
THE RISK OF PENSION FUNDS
Government and enterprises in the risk of pension 
funds, there is not only a game relationship, but also the 
cooperation relationship. The establishment of a new type 
of cooperative relationship is the guarantee for the normal 
operation of the pension funds in China.
From the perspective of enterprises, enterprises need 
to pay social insurance premiums in full, to reduce the 
financial burden of the government. Corporate social 
responsibility should become a bottom line, and the 
enterprises’ economic and business prosperity is equally 
important, but also an urgent needs to do business. China 
Europe International Business School and Daimler-
Chrysler Corporation believes that the successful 
business and corporate social responsibility in the hands 
of enterprises must grasp and enterprises when engaged 
in commercial activities should also taking into account 
the social background. Therefore, corporate social 
responsibility is undoubtedly one of the most senior 
corporate strategies.
From the government point of view, the government 
should give enterprises with strong financial subsidies. 
Enterprises is the creator of social wealth, is the driving 
force of economic development, therefore, the health of 
the enterprises is very important for the national economy. 
Government should not be too much interference in 
business operation, should not be too much to replace 
market resource allocation function, but should better 
committed to create a good social environment, legal 
environment, the competitive environment for the 
enterprises service.
Therefore, the government and enterprises must work 
together to deal with the problem of population aging, 
improve and stabilize the pension insurance system is an 
important pillar of the aging society.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
The old-age insurance fund shrinking increases the 
operational risks of the social security system of our 
country, how to effectively transport the fund in order to 
achieve the goal of preserving and increasing the value 
has become a difficult problem to be solved. Taking into 
account the current problems of China’s pension insurance 
funds, based on the experience of foreign countries for 
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reference, put forward to further improve the management 
of pension funds in china.
(a) The Flexibility to Postpone Retirement 
Age, and Reduce the Overall Pension Payment 
Pressure
With the development of society, the life expectancy of 
the population is increasing. For the pension insurance 
system, is in the case of the individual account payment 
period, extended the payment period of the overall 
account. According to China’s present income pooling 
account system of pay as you go system, under the 
background of deepening of the aging of the population, 
and gradually to postpone the retirement age is the 
overall response to the pension payment pressure 
increases the effective measures. Flexible retirement 
age is a reasonable choice to reduce the burden of the 
system. At the same time, to postpone the retirement 
age can increase the accumulation of individual account 
pension, for the vast majority of official staff, rising 
the retirement age can extend their payment period and 
improve retirement income.
(b) Improve the Social Security Fund to Co-
ordinate Level
The current management of the pension insurance fund 
in China is the lack of efficiency of the operation of the 
pension fund. From the point of view of fund investment 
management and supervision, the pension fund is in urgent 
need of upgrading the overall level. On the one hand, 
because of the market economic system of our country is 
still not perfect, almost all existing social security fund 
investment to county and municipal management based, 
which not only lack of perfect investment governance 
structure, investment institutions and professionals, it is 
difficult to play the effect of the size of the investment. 
On the other hand, the social security fund centralized 
management has also reduced the management level, 
which is helpful for the supervision mechanism to better 
supervise the fund running of the various links, improve 
the efficiency of supervision. Therefore, to achieve the 
overall management of all kinds of social security funds 
as soon as possible, which are a key link to eliminate the 
social security fund market investment barriers.
(c) Open Up Multi-channel Investment to Achieve 
the Value of the Pension Value
In the face of the aging of the population, the overall 
pension payment pressure, on the one hand, it should 
open up more channels of pension financing model. 
China’s pension insurance payment from enterprises and 
workers, social pooling account funds mainly from the 
enterprises, and the enterprises payment rate shall not 
exceed 20% of the local average wage. As far as China’s 
current situation is concerned, it is impossible to raise the 
rate of payment. So, open up the way of financing is an 
important guarantee for the sustainable development of 
the pension. On the other hand, improve the accumulation 
of pension funds. The endowment insurance system in 
China personal account with fund accumulation function. 
On the basis of individual accounts, the individual 
account fund not only to avoid inflation caused by the 
devaluation of the, but also to meet the living needs of the 
employee retirement.
(d) The Establishment of a Multi-pillar Pension 
Insurance System
The World Bank vigorously advocated three pillar pension 
models: first pillar is mandatory collection of pay as you 
go social basic endowment insurance; the second pillar 
is funded mandatory pension; the third pillar is voluntary 
supplementary pension. The three pillar models not only 
meet the needs of different people, but also to ensure the 
realization of the goal of old-age security. To encourage 
enterprises to develop the enterprises annuity system as a 
supplementary pension insurance, increase the preferential 
support for commercial insurance, improve the living 
standards of retired workers. At the same time, to actively 
develop family support, community care, pension and 
other non economic pillars of the housing, and strengthen 
the construction of pension insurance multi pillar system. 
This can effectively disperse the pension risk, but also to 
reduce the financial burden of the country, to ensure the 
sustainable development of the pension.
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